The Legitimacy of Open Source and Other Software Licenses by Madison, Michael J.
University of Pittsburgh School of Law
University of Pittsburgh School of Law Working Paper Series
Year  Paper 
The Legitimacy of Open Source and Other
Software Licenses
Michael J. Madison∗
∗University of PIttsburgh, madison@law.pitt.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-
cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art15
Copyright c©2005 by the author.
The Legitimacy of Open Source and Other
Software Licenses
Michael J. Madison
Abstract
Software licensing and licensing of digital information in general create a regime
of information governance for the Internet and beyond. This Article proposes to
describe how this regime works—or fails to work—in legal terms.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Software licensing and licensing of digital information in general create a regime of information 
governance for the Internet and beyond.  This Article proposes to describe how this regime works—or 
fails to work—in legal terms. 
 
What prompts this discussion is the emergence of “open source” licensing,1 a scheme of software 
licensing that makes comprehensive governance of a field of information production and distribution—
the creation and maintenance of an information “commons”—its goal, rather than its by-product. But the 
conceptual problems underlying software-licensing-as-governance are not limited to the open source 
model.  They extend to “conventional” negotiated, bilateral software licenses; to shrinkwrap, click-
through, and click-wrap license forms in the mass market (for both computer programs and for other 
digital information works); and to technologies for “Digital Rights Management” and laws, such as the 
anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),2 designed to protect 
them.  All three of these legal forms are expressions of a single licensing framework.  This Article aims to 
explore the conceptual conflicts they embody. 
 
Scholars and advocates who praise the open source licensing model and condemn the DMCA and 
standard proprietary licenses must confront what appear to be structural commonalities among them.  To 
promote the open source model, it appears, is to accept the legitimacy of licensing models that the open 
source model is designed to oppose.  One way to confront this paradox is to question whether and when 
licenses are enforceable legal artifacts in the first place.  Governance raises legitimacy questions.  What is 
the source of the legitimacy of software licensing? 
 
Licensing is governance of an unusual sort, since it operates at several levels simultaneously.  At the level 
of the individual license, all licenses of copyrighted works exert some form of governance.  Licenses 
define the circumstances under which those who work with copyrighted material can do so without fear of 
suit.  Software licensing takes this a step further.  For all intents and purposes, according to software 
licenses themselves, copies of computer programs are never sold outright.  They are always licensed.  On 
a second level, “the” license for a given program governs not only the relationship between the copyright 
owner and a particular licensee but also the relationship between the owner and all “users” of that 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  E-mail: madison@law.pitt.edu.  Copyright 2005 
Michael J. Madison.  This article is adapted from Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003). 
1 Open source licensing schemes permit users to access both the source code and object code of a particular 
computer program.  In contrast, conventional or closed source licensing schemes typically permit access only to the 
object code, preventing manipulations of the underlying program itself.  A more thorough definition of open source 
licensing is provided in Part II.B. 
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
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 program.  Each user may pay royalties according to a different schedule (or not pay royalties at all), but 
the license serves as an effective constitution for the information domain defined by the program.  At a 
third level, to the extent that all computer programs are subject to licenses and to the extent that those 
licenses are effectively identical in relevant respects, the world of software is effectively governed by the 
very concept of the license.  If there is no ability to choose an “unlicensed” version of the copyrighted 
work, the licensing norm displaces the Copyright Act as the relevant law.  To the extent that this norm 
extends beyond computer programs to digital works of all kinds and potentially to all copyrighted works, 
the Copyright Act recedes to an ever greater extent.  Understanding the legitimacy of the licensing norm, 
as both a formal and an informal governance institution, is important at each of these levels. 
 
A key common concern is the following: Owners of software copyrights purport to “license” copies of the 
programs themselves as well as the work of authorship that each copy contains.  Governance thus extends 
not only to the manner in which “licensees” work with (intangible) copyrighted works of authorship but 
also to the manner in which “licensees” work with (at least nominally tangible) artifacts,3 and to their 
transactions in artifacts.  In the digital age, the licensing norm supplies a regime of private governance of 
all aspects of our information culture, both intangible and tangible. 
 
There are at least three possible sources of legitimacy and thus enforceability here, which can be roughly 
categorized as follows.  First, licensing and each individual license may consist of a valid, specialized 
application of contractual norms, either in a stand-alone framework (that is, licenses are nothing more 
than enforceable contracts) or representing the enforceable allocation and re-distribution of property law 
entitlements in computer software.  Second, licensing as a system of information governance may be a 
custom or norm that has been effectively adopted as law and that should justify enforcement of any 
particular license.  Third, licensing as private governance may operate effectively as a system of private 
ordering of social arrangements.   
 
My goal in this Article is primarily to explain the concept of software licensing as information 
governance, and to analyze that concept with the tools most familiar to practicing lawyers, and judges:  
conventional copyright, contract, and property law.  Elsewhere, I assess the second and third potential 
sources of legitimacy—custom, and the notion of private ordering.4  Overall, I conclude that none of these 
sources supplies complete and effective legal support for the software license, particularly as background 
distinctions between computer “software” and “hardware,” on the one hand, and the world of legal 
regulation, on the other, are eroding.  Foundational problems with licensing-as-governance mean that it 
may be time to jettison licensing as a conceptual framework, at least in some contexts.  Collaborative 
social relationships among participants in open source projects, and “commons” and public domain 
dimensions of information production and distribution, may be better supported using other frameworks. 
Controlled, proprietary information production and distribution may likewise turn out to be poorly 
matched to the licensing model.  Our existing conceptual category—licensing-as-governance in 
particular—may turn out to be a poor legal guide to the multiplicity of paths that the world of digital 
information creates. 
 
II. LICENSING AS GOVERNANCE 
 
In a sense, most of us know how licensing works.  In another sense, we do not, or at least we rarely focus 
on its legal mechanics.  This Part describes the practice of licensing of digital information generally as a 
mode of private governance of the contemporary information environment.  It describes the key features 
                                                 
3 “Artifact” in general means any object produced by human workmanship.  I use the term to refer both to common 
tangible or physical instantiations of copyrighted works, such as books, as well as modern abstract equivalents, such 
as computer programs, that, in practice, have no meaningful tangible substrate.  
4 See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003). 
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 that link the legal forms that licensing takes, including conventional licenses for pre-written computer 
programs and other digital works, open source software licenses, and copy and access control 
technologies, including Digital Rights Management technologies regulated by the DMCA and potentially 
applicable to all digital information works. 
 
Any license of a copyrighted work is a way of describing rights to “own” and “use” certain cultural 
artifacts.  To copyright lawyers, the landscape of the license, and thus of the software license, is familiar. 
For books or plays or films, the landscape described by the license is relatively simple and categorical.  
The license does not describe who owns the physical book or script or film itself, though that “thing” may 
be leased or rented, and the document entitled “license” may describe the terms of that rental.  Perhaps 
explicit but typically implicit in that document are two facts: First, that there exists a legally defined 
“work of authorship” that is embodied in that thing but that has a legally recognized existence 
independent of it, and second, that ownership of the physical thing is a legal status that exists 
independently of ownership of the copyright in that “work of authorship.”   
 
There are thus three distinct legal phenomena represented in that landscape: ownership of the physical 
book (which may reside with the copyright owner or with the user); ownership of the “work of 
authorship” itself, which we know as the copyright in the work and which remains with the licensor; and 
the license to enjoy some right within that copyright, which is granted to the licensee. 
 
The landscape defined by the typical software license is different.  The software license defines its subject 
not only as the enjoyment of some right within the copyright in a given computer program but also as “the 
Program” itself.  The licensor typically asserts that it retains title to “the Program,” by which the license 
means not “the copyright to the Program,” but “this particular copy of the Program that the licensee is 
paying for.”  The license then goes on to provide that the licensee has only the rights to reproduce or 
distribute the Program as may be provided in the text of the license, and the licensee may, or may not, 
dispose of its copy of the Program according to the terms of the license.  The landscape of the software 
license has four, not three, distinct legal phenomena represented within it: ownership of the disc, tape, 
cartridge, or chip on which the user’s copy of the Program is stored (and which is typically owned 
outright by the software user); ownership of the Program, that is, the electronic instantiation of the 
instructions that comprise the computer program, stored on that medium (according to typical software 
licenses, this is owned by the copyright owner and “licensed” to the user); ownership of the copyright in 
that Program, which is the work of authorship (also owned by the copyright owner); and the license to 
enjoy some right within that copyright (granted to the licensee).  To own the work of authorship in a 
“book” is to own the copyright in that work but not necessarily to own each book containing that work.  
In the typical software license, a software developer owns both a copyright in the Program and title to 
each copy of that Program imprinted somewhere on a disk. 
 
It is this unique assertion of control over the tangible artifact, the user’s particular copy of the Program, 
that distinguishes licensing of digital electronic works from the traditional world of copyright licensing.  
In the digital context, the argument runs as follows:  That artifact cannot pass from its initial “licensee” to 
another except by permission of the artifact’s owner, which is the copyright owner. And if it cannot so 
pass, then that permission may be granted conditionally.  In effect, each copy of the Program itself may 
be painted with the condition, so that its “licensed” status remains intact as it passes from storage medium 
to storage medium, and from possessor to possessor.  No copy of that Program ever exists that is not 
“owned” by its initial “creator.”  This Part describes how this framework can be traced through not only 
conventional “closed source” software licenses but through all forms of contemporary software licensing. 
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 A. THE CLOSED SOURCE LICENSE 
 
The core of the conventional software license is copyright-based legal protection for the computer 
program.  The conventional software license consists of a document or electronic record that accompanies 
each copy of the program, characteristically in object code form only, formally assented to by each user 
of that program.  The license specifies the scope of the user’s legal right to make use of that object code.  
Most important among the specifications of permitted and proscribed uses, the conventional license states 
that the licensee may not modify the program in any way or “reverse engineer” the object code that has 
been provided, that is, to engage in any of a number of techniques that might be used to reverse the 
translation process and obtain a copy of the source code to the program. 
 
The conventional license goes one important step beyond recitals of acceptable and unacceptable use.  
The license states that title to the code itself, to the particular copy of the program (in object code form) 
that is acquired by the licensee, remains with the developer.  In this sense, the software license is designed 
to defeat copyright law’s doctrine of first sale, which would otherwise permit the “licensee” to re-
distribute that copy of the program, and copyright’s traditional distinction between the work of authorship 
protected by copyright law and the tangible artifact in which a work is embodied that is protected by other 
law. This gives bite to the conventional license statement that forbids the “licensee” from transferring this 
copy of the object code without the permission of the developer,5 to the claim that the software product 
cannot be broken into components and redistributed in “unbundled” form,6 and to the licensor’s argument 
that “ordinary” use of the program, which typically involves reproducing the work on the licensee’s 
computer, is authorized, if at all, by the license and not by operation of copyright law.7  In short, the 
license is supposed to be enforceable because these conditions and restrictions are legally attached to each 
copy of the program, and they bind any user who uses that copy.  All use of the computer program, at all 
times, is legally controlled by the copyright owner, acting through the license.   
 
B. THE OPEN SOURCE LICENSE 
 
The open source model of software licensing is characterized by a philosophy of structured openness and 
sharing of a computer program’s source code, rather than the inherent closure that characterizes the 
conventional license.8  But the basic software licensing framework—control of use, via control of title to 
the code itself—remains the same.  As the conventional license begins with the developer’s ownership of 
the software copyright, the open source model begins with control of the copyright in the code by some 
entity or group.9  Though open source licenses differ from one another in many technical respects, under 
                                                 
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (providing ownership of a particular copy as a defense to claims of unauthorized 
distribution under section 106). 
6 See Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
7 Section 117 of the Copyright Act permits the “owner” of a copy of a computer program to engage in limited 
copying of that program in connection with its ordinary use.  See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).  A mere “licensee” of that 
copy has, it appears, no rights under this section. 
8 The open source “movement” increasingly self-identifies as F/OSS, which stands for Free and Open Source 
Software.  The terminology reflects philosophical biases, not legal distinction.  The philosophical bases of the open 
source movement are as important as the legitimacy of its legal forms.  The “open source” movement emphasizes 
the more reliable character of “open” code somewhat more than its freedom from conventional property-based 
control.  See Open Source Initiative, at http:// www.opensource.org.  The latter is the hallmark of the “free software” 
movement.  See generally Free Software Found., GNU’s Not Unix, at http://www.fsf.org.  For my purposes, I focus 
on the license forms themselves, most of which are collected around the “open source” model described in the text. 
9 Criteria for certification of a license form as meeting the best-established definition of “open source” license are 
published by the Open Source Initiative at http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php. 
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 any open source license the source code of the program must always be available for inspection and 
adaptation by users, researchers, and customers—that is, anyone who wants to work with or use the 
program.  Any future user, researcher, programmer, or customer is free to adapt and modify that code as 
he or she would like.  Users are free to redistribute compiled (machine-executable) versions of their 
modified versions, for a fee or otherwise.  The original source code must remain available, and the license 
under which it was obtained must provide that derivative creators may distribute the source code to their 
adaptations or modifications.   
 
Not all open source licenses require distribution of the source code to modifications.10  Terms that do so 
are sometimes referred to as “copyleft” provisions and appear in the widely-used, open-source-qualified 
GNU General Public License11 and the Mozilla Public License.12  (Both license forms are certified under 
the Open Source Definition (“OSD”), published by the not-for-profit Open Source Initiative (“OSI”).  To 
be certified by OSI as an OSD-compliant license, the license must provide that any distribution of the 
program, in its original form and as modified, include source code.)13 By extending the source code 
disclosure obligation across all participants in an open source development project, “copyleft” emphasizes 
the value that the open source model generally ascribes to access to source code across time and that is 
characteristic of the open source model as a whole.  In some descriptions of the model, the term 
“copyleft” is avoided in favor of broader descriptions of the principle that any onward distribution of the 
code be accompanied by license terms identical to those that accompanied receipt of the code,14 including 
terms that mandate the availability of the source code.  This mechanism thus implements the idea that the 
open source model represents an ongoing venture in managed collaboration15 and, more generally, the 
creation and sustenance of an innovation “commons.”16  As with closed source licenses, however, any use 
of the program that would conflict with the express terms of the license is forbidden.17  Violation of those 
terms causes the license to terminate. 
 
                                                 
10 The distinction between licenses that require that source code be included in any downstream distribution of the 
source code and licenses that permit but do not require downstream source distribution is the distinction between 
what some refer to as “copyleft” provisions, for the former, and “open source” provisions, for the latter.  See David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 254. 
11 Free Software Found., The GNU General Public License (GPL), available at 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/gpl-license.php. 
12 Open Source Initiative, Mozilla Public License, available at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mozilla1.0.php. 
13 Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition para. 23, at http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php. 
14 See Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 594-602; 
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing how 
the open source model exemplifies a model of distributed industrial production).  The use of “copyleft” as a 
rhetorical term is associated primarily with the Free Software Foundation, promoter of “free” software.  See 
generally Free Software Found., The Free Software Definition, at http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/free-sw.html. 
15 Nothing in the open source model prohibits firms from selling copies of open source programs, including copies 
of versions compiled into machine-readable code, so long as sales are made under the terms of the relevant open 
source license. 
16 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 49-73 
(2001) (discussing commons in the context of open source licensing). 
17 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software 
Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 185-89 (1999); McGowan, supra note 10, at 
254-60; Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349, 355-61 
(2002); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in 
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1312-13 (1998). 
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 C. THE OPEN SOURCE LICENSE AS A SPECIALIZED SOFTWARE LICENSE 
 
The “open” (or shared) source code model thus sharply contrasts with the conventional “closed” (or 
hidden) source code model at one level but adopts the same underlying legal framework.  In the former, 
both legally and technologically speaking, the program is meant to be distributed and shared among all of 
its producers and consumers.  In the latter, both legally and technologically speaking, the program is 
meant to be controlled by the original producer.  The open source model is ultimately a specialized 
application of the general purpose conventional software license. 
 
Their descriptive equivalence can be observed in two key respects.  First, both “open source” and “closed 
source” licenses derive their legal legitimacy from the copyright owners’ claims to own and control all 
aspects of computer program codes that are used by individual end users or developers.  Second, both 
forms of license assert comprehensive statements of the scope of the users’ rights and obligations with 
respect both to the code and to the copyright in the code and limit the users’ rights only to those granted 
in the license itself, rather than to any rights supplied by the Copyright Act or other law.  A software 
license, whether open or closed source, is a soup-to-nuts statement of the scope of legitimate behavior by 
a user or consumer of that software with respect to both the artifact itself, the information contained in 
that artifact, and the copyright, if any, that applies to that information.18 
 
D. THE DMCA AS LICENSING 
 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA constitute a third, equivalent effort to ratify the licensing 
norm, to the extent that the norm is embodied in digital technology itself.  In colloquial terms, these 
sections of the DMCA grant legal protection to parties that use Digital Rights Management (“DRM”), a 
label for a collection of technologies, including encryption, watermarking, and rights permission 
databases, designed to monitor, charge for, and if necessary, prevent any and all conceivable uses of 
digital works by end users.19  The DMCA validates a species of licensing and is thus part of licensing’s 
regime of information governance.20 
 
The DMCA provides civil remedies and the possibility of criminal penalties for two related acts.  First, 
the act of “circumventing” a “technological measure” that “effectively controls access” to a copyrighted 
work is prohibited under § 1201(a)(1)(A).21  “[T]o ‘circumvent a technological measure’ means to 
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner.”22  “A 
                                                 
18 The two license styles are not precisely congruent.  Open source licenses typically permit unlimited reproduction, 
for example, and tinkering with open source code is encouraged rather than forbidden.  The structural similarity lies 
in the efforts of both license styles to specify the scope of the user’s right in the licensed work, in ways that differ 
categorically from the rights that the Copyright Act would otherwise supply.  Reverse engineering might be 
permitted as a form of fair use.  See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Installation and non-concurrent use of a single copy of the program on different computers might be permitted under 
the first sale doctrine or by the principle distinguishing the copyright in a work of authorship from the work’s 
tangible instantiation.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 202 (2000). 
19 See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 41, 47-49 (2001) (describing basic contours of DRM technologies). 
20 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2003) 
(analyzing and comparing the DMCA and click-wrap licenses, among other things, as species of access control 
regimes). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
22 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
Madison – Legitimacy of Open Source – Manuscript of 1/25/05  -- Do Not Quote or Cite Without the 
Author’s Permission 
6
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art15
 technological measure ‘effectively controls access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its 
operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the 
copyright owner, to gain access to the work.”23  A related provision of the statute forbids “trafficking” in 
anti-circumvention technology.24  A second provision prohibits trafficking in technology that is primarily 
designed for the purpose of circumventing technological protection measures that effectively protect a 
right of a copyright holder.25  “Any person injured by a violation of sections 1201 or 1202”26 has standing 
to sue.27  No threshold of harm need be established.  The act of circumventing or trafficking in the 
circumvention technology constitutes the violation. 
 
Some form of “technological protection measure” assuring the owner of control over “access” to the work 
and/or over “rights” in the work must be deployed before these provisions of the DMCA apply.  Any 
copyrighted work will do, and the technological protection measure need be only “effective,”28 not 
perfect.  Formally, the copyright owner may choose between “rights” control technology and “access” 
control technology.  “Rights” control technology governs what the user may do with the work once access 
is properly obtained.  “Access” control technology governs obtaining rights to look at, listen to, or 
otherwise use the work in the first place.  Access control technology receives greater protection under the 
DMCA than rights control technology.  While the DMCA prohibits trafficking in technologies for 
circumventing both access control technologies and for circumventing rights control technologies, 
actually circumventing rights control technology is not subject to the exceptions provided by the DMCA 
to liability for circumvention of access control technology.29  
 
Enforcement of these rules in tandem ratifies decisions by the copyright owner to encode in DRM 
systems rules that bypass established limitations on the rights of the copyright holder established by 
copyright law itself, in ways that are precisely equivalent to bypass tactics used in software licensing.  
First sale?  “Access” disabling technologies permit copyright owners to condition seeing or using the 
work on any terms they prefer.  Fair use?  The DMCA states that “[n]othing in this section shall affect 
rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title”; 30 
but that section has been interpreted as not affording a “fair use” defense to defendants accused of 
violating the DMCA.31  The DMCA ratifies precisely the kind of soup-to-nuts regulatory scheme offered 
                                                 
23 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). 
24 Id. § 1201(a)(2). 
25 Id. § 1201(b)(1).  A parallel definition of “effective technological measure” that relates to a “right” of a copyright 
owner rather than “access” to a copyrighted work appears in § 1201(b)(2)(B).  It appears that the act of 
circumventing a technological protection measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright holder is not 
unlawful under the DMCA, if one can lawfully acquire a device that permits doing so. 
26 Section 1202 addresses maintaining the integrity of “copyright management information.”  Id. § 1202. 
27 Id. § 1203(a). 
28 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(g) (specifying exceptions to liability for circumventing access control technology). 
30 Id. § 1201(c)(1). 
31 The distinction between “access” and “rights” control mechanisms that the statute articulates has been honored by 
courts more in the breach than in the observance.  As a practical matter, for now, “access” to a copyrighted work 
includes not only the customer’s or user’s initial access to the work, but any subsequent access to the work as well.  
See R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of 
Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 637-38 (2003).  Technology that governs the latter is 
therefore subject to the stronger anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking prohibitions available under 
§ 1201(a)(1)(A), and the DMCA, like the software license, becomes an all-purpose “access control” statute, enabling 
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 by the software license, effected by control of the artifact as well as control over use of the work of 
authorship, now encoded in DRM and other technological systems. 
 
E. FROM LICENSING TO GOVERNANCE 
 
As information governance, the software licensing norm in all three forms carries forward some 
traditional features of the copyright universe.  Producers of copyrighted works have always had tools that 
permitted them to control access to and use of both their works and the physical instantiations of their 
works.32  The laws of real and personal property meant that audience members could be lawfully and 
physically excluded from bookstores and movie theaters, and that theaters and performers could be bound 
to contractual film or sheet music rental arrangements.  In addition, as artifacts, photographs and books 
were self-regulating.  One could not use the work without access to a copy.  Copyright owners could 
choose to go farther under copyright law and use licenses to define the scope of permitted use (typically 
among business or commercial interests), but the extent of the control over use permitted by control over 
the copy was limited to situations involving initial access, in true lease or rental contexts. 
 
With digital technology and its networked form, the Internet, the physical objects of information 
regulation become transparent and in many cases essentially invisible.  The former implicit and limited 
governance defined by control of access to the chattel and licensing of the copyright evaporates, and the 
software license tries to replicate it.  The license claims to encompass all aspects of the work, which 
includes both the “chattel,” now dephysicalized, as well as the copyright interest.  Under traditional 
copyright and property law, the inherent nature of physical property regulated the tangible, while 
copyright law used licenses to control the use.  With digital technology, the software license controls 
both.  It controls the chattel in order to control the use.33  Moreover, the licensing model assumes that this 
control extends not just to the licensee’s access to the chattel or to initial access to the chattel but to any 
access, by any user, at any time.  The networked dimension of digital information and the ubiquity of 
licensing of digital information multiply this effect.  It is nearly impossible to find a computer program in 
distribution today—even one distributed for free—that is not accompanied by a license bearing the classic 
form and governing ongoing use of both the copyrighted work and the program itself.   
                                                 
 
control of each physical copy of a copyrighted work as well as all uses of that work—precisely as the standard 
license norm governs access to both the physical copy of the computer program itself (by reserving title to the code) 
and the use of computer programs (by delineating all forms of acceptable use).  A handful of courts have resisted 
application of this scheme to tangible goods in which copyrighted computer programs happen to be embedded.  See 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (cartridges for computer parts); 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (garage door openers). 
32 See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. 
Copyright Law (arguing that access controls have always been an implicit part of copyright policy), in UNITED 
STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 2002). 
33 Library patrons borrow and return books but acquire no ownership interest in either the copyrights or the books 
themselves.  Customers of video rental stores acquire possession but not ownership of videocassettes.  Movie 
studios that own the copyrights in such films argue that customers acquire a license (sometimes express, sometimes 
implied) to perform these audiovisual works in the home.  (Technically, no such license is required, since “home” 
performance is not an exclusive right of the copyright owner.)  The same applies to publishers of sheet music.  
Orchestras and choruses rent copies of scores and execute express licenses that authorize public performances of 
these works.  The “license” in each of these contexts, whether express or implied, refers only to the copyright 
interests conveyed.  No ownership in the tangible forms passes to the customer, who customarily expects to return 
the object after using it.  The reproducibility of rented computer programs introduced complications to this standard 
account that were largely cured by the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, which essentially 
prohibits rental of copyrighted computer programs.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2000); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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Even before the commercial development of the Internet, mass-market licenses for computer software 
exhibited the kind of uniformity of terms that rendered form contracts problematic.  With the coming of 
the Internet, the licensing norm developed for computer programs has been gradually but seamlessly 
extended to all forms of copyrighted works in digital form, including both “creative” websites and 
collections of digitized data.  Technological advances, tracked by the law, are increasingly blending the 
analog and the digital.34  Copyright law has long assumed that a “book” cannot be licensed, that is, cannot 
be permanently transferred to another subject to continuing conditions on its further use and disposition,35 
but an electronic book—the same text, rendered in digital form—clearly can be, at least under current 
practice.  If copyright law is a publicly enacted regime of information governance, then a comprehensive 
privately arranged-for copyright substitute governs likewise. 
 
Licenses govern the parties to the license.  The step from govern to governance is a step up in scale, and 
that scale is provided by digital technology and the network—the Internet—that digital technology makes 
possible.  Not all copyrighted works are governed by licenses.  One can still buy a book or borrow one 
from the public library, and copyright law, not a license, still applies.  With computer programs and 
digital works, and in the absence of a network, even a single license has a relatively limited, bilateral 
scope.  Frequently, an individual or firm would have a meaningful choice between “licensed” works in 
electronic form and their unlicensed equivalents in analog form.  For example, when LexisNexis and 
Westlaw services were supplied only via proprietary, dumb terminals, law libraries still maintained 
complete inventories of case reporters and statutory compilations.  The digital data essentially was tied to 
the machine, much as older computer programs essentially were tied to mainframe computers. 
 
It was the interoperability of computer programs and digital data across networks—the liberation of the 
program from the machine—that led to the explosion of digital content.  It gave rise to conventional mass 
market licenses and now to open source licenses. It is the interoperability of digital information of all 
kinds across the Internet and related networks that gave rise to the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA.  By virtue of the network, the threat of unauthorized reproduction stretches far beyond the initial 
parties to the license, beyond those individuals who happen to be accessing the electronic network at any 
given point in time.  The supplier delivering an information good is concerned not only about the 
relationship with the recipient of that good—the initial user (who is governed by a license)—but all 
potential relationships with further and future users of that good (the governance worked by the license).  
Conventional licenses and the DMCA constitute licensing-as-governance because they treat the network 
                                                 
34 One interesting piece of evidence of the phenomenon comes from the Creative Commons initiative, which offers 
forms of licenses that expressly anticipate that a work will be distributed in analog and digital forms concurrently 
and allow the author or publisher to customize user rights accordingly.  See Creative Commons, Licenses Explained, 
at http://www.creativecommons.org/learn/ licenses. 
35 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (explaining that the sole right to read a copyrighted 
book does not include the right to impose, by a notice printed on the same page with the notice of the copyright, a 
limitation as to what price the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers with whom there is no privity of 
contract).  As the Supreme Court described the common-law principle in a Sherman Act case decided shortly after 
Bobbs-Merrill, “The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, 
and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved 
by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand.”  Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911) (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907)).  This is 
not to say that valid restraints on alienation are unheard of, but merely that copyright law supplies an abundance of 
reasons to confirm that their prohibition makes sense in the copyright context. 
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 as a threat.  The open source license constitutes licensing-as-governance because it tries to capture the 
benefit of the network.36 
 
The balance of this Article considers whether and when the open source model should be enforced legally 
and includes implicit and explicit critiques of conventional software licensing and of the DMCA.  Legally 
speaking, courts have addressed the validity of the conventional software license, though without 
unanimous approval.37  Those few courts that have considered the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA have upheld it against constitutional challenge and have relied on it to punish circumvention of a 
variety of technological measures guarding copyrighted works.  Because widespread use of open source 
licenses only developed recently, the open source model is largely untested in the courts.  There is no 
reported decision analyzing a defection by a participant in an open source licensing community, or by a 
developer redistributing copies of open source programs in a closed source format or without the source 
code of modifications.  To date, when defections have occurred, they have been handled informally, 
under the norms of the relevant developer community.38  The blending of the original norm-driven, not-
for-profit “hacker” community that developed the open source ethos and the commercial interests that see 
open source licensing as a potentially profitable marketing tool suggests that more public, hostile, and 
litigated conflicts are likely. 
 
III. THE COMMON LAW OF INFORMATION LICENSING 
 
Ask virtually any practicing lawyer about the legal significance of a software license, and the answer 
almost inevitably will be framed in terms of contractual obligations and property rights.  The conventional 
lawyer’s understanding of the software license is that it is simply a contract that defines the obligations of 
the licensor and licensee.  The first argument for legitimacy is that software licensing relies on a 
legitimate but purely positive legal framework, drawn wholesale from the domain of promissory 
obligation wrapped around a core of property rights.  Whatever the licensor and licensee agree to do, they 
are legally bound thereby. 
 
Though most of the recent litigation and scholarship concerning shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and browsewrap 
“contracts” has concerned the question of user assent, to evaluate the claim of legitimacy based on 
contract law principles, it is important to go beyond the question of assent.  Assume, for now, that 
software users assent to the forms presented to them.  The question is whether assent means something in 
                                                 
36 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 46-47 (2003) (discussing distributed production, including open source software, via 
distributed information governance processes). 
37 A number of decisions establish judicial precedent sanctioning the form of the conventional software license 
under which the licensor retains title to both the code and the copyright.  See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse 
Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 
(9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 
886 F.2d 1081, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 1989); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002); Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 995 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Adobe Sys., 
Inc. v. One Stop Micro Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & 
Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990); Data Prods., Inc. v. Reppart, No. 89-1291-K, 1990 WL 198610 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 1990).  Cases 
questioning the legitimacy of the model include Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 
1991); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001); and Communications 
Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1988). 
38 The highly publicized litigation between the SCO Group and IBM primarily questions the scope of SCO’s rights, 
if any, in computer code distributed by IBM under open source licenses.   
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 this context.  What exactly is a software license? As an agreement between two parties, a transaction 
concerning a copy of a computer program is a form of contract.  As an expression of a limitation on 
access to an owner’s copyright interest, a license is more akin to a form of property, though it is not a 
property interest as such.39  The term “license agreement,” though standard in the software industry, is a 
misnomer because it conflates these property-like and contract attributes of software transactions.  
Understanding the license requires eliminating that conflation.40 
 
In copyright terms, a license of a copyright interest is a grant of permission to exploit the unique type of 
property interest known as copyright. The copyright owner (the licensor) grants to some user or consumer 
(the licensee) permission to use the copyrighted work in some way that would otherwise be reserved 
exclusively to the owner under section 106 of the Copyright Act.  An entire section 106 right need not be 
conveyed.  The rights may be subdivided and combined in thousands of ways.  The recipient need not 
formally agree to be bound by the limitations stated by the owner. The license may be revoked at any 
time, but the recipient is automatically bound and is liable for copyright infringement if the bounds of the 
license are exceeded.41 
 
Conveyance of a right to exploit the copyrighted work of authorship is distinct from conveyance of an 
interest in a tangible form that embodies the copyrighted work.  That tangible form may be sold to the 
recipient, or rented or leased (so that the tangible object is intended to be returned to its original 
owner),42or it may be given to the recipient outright. Ordinarily the form of the transaction in the tangible 
good has no bearing on the character of any parallel transaction in the copyright interest, though in some 
cases the two transactions are conceptually and legally linked.  Delivery of special effects film footage to 
a motion picture producer with the expectation that the footage will be incorporated into a finished film 
includes at least an implied license to distribute the footage.43  The right to prepare a derivative work may 
imply the right to distribute copies of that work.44  In both cases, however, the licensee’s agreement or 
assent is not relevant to enforceability of the license, unless the copyright owner conditions the license on 
a promise of or receipt of compensation. 
 
Contract concerns arise in four possible scenarios.  First, the owner of the copyright may want to 
condition the license on a promise of royalties from the licensee.  Second, the owner of the copyright may 
want to obtain the licensee’s promise both not to use the work as the Copyright Act would otherwise 
                                                 
39 The license is a transaction in neither property nor contract; the “license” means only an immunity from suit.  See 
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 125 (1938). 
40 Software “licensing,” as noted earlier, conflates transactions in intangible interests in software copyright and 
tangible interests in the “fixed medium of expression” that contains the “copy” of the copyrighted work.  The 
software license as a copyright form applies only to the intangible.  The tangible interest is addressed in the same 
document, but rights in that interest are governed by other law.  Practitioners, scholars, and courts, however, tend to 
treat both as copyright problems. 
41 See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing scope and construction 
of licenses); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding that the 
licensee violated an obligation of good faith in performance of the contract). 
42 It is possible that a rental or lease arrangement could be designed so that the item is not returned after use by the 
lessee ends.  The useful life of the item may expire concurrently with the term of the lease, and the lessor may 
authorize the lessee to dispose of the item rather than return it to the lessor.  Whether such an arrangement 
constitutes an authentic lease or a disguised sale should be analyzed according to functional criteria comparable to 
those applied to similar questions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
43 See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990). 
44 See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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 prohibit (a promise that is meaningless in contractual terms, for the licensee is offering not to do 
something that it is already prohibited from doing),45 and also a promise not to use the work as the 
Copyright Act would otherwise permit.  Third, the licensee may want to obtain a promise from the 
licensor not to revoke the license.  Fourth, the owner of the copyright may want to bargain over other 
commercial concerns related to use of the copyrighted work, such as limitations of liability or limitations 
of remedy. 
 
Whether copyright or contract law is applicable to each of these issues involves some careful analysis.  
Limitations of warranty, limitations of remedy, and other purely commercial concerns, are always matters 
of contract and cannot be enforced except in contract law.  If the licensee fails to pay royalties promised 
under the license, then the licensor has a claim for breach of contract.  If the licensor attempts to revoke 
the license for reasons not permitted by contract law, the licensee has a claim for breach of contract.  If 
the licensee exceeds the scope of the license and uses the work in a way reserved exclusively to the 
copyright owner under section 106 of the Copyright Act, which defines the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner, then the licensor has a claim for copyright infringement.  Doctrinally, the licensor’s 
alleged breach of contract claim in such a case should be preempted under section 301 since the licensee’s 
affront to the licensor’s interest in the work of authorship is precisely the type of affront that the 
Copyright Act is designed to regulate.  The licensee’s use of the work in a way reserved exclusively to the 
copyright owner and forbidden under the license but permitted under section 106 raises the most difficult 
interpretive question. Under a strong view of copyright preemption, no copyright claim will lie and a 
potential contract claim will be preempted by the Copyright Act and/or by the Constitution.46  Under a 
weaker view of the preemptive reach of copyright law and policy, and the one currently favored by the 
majority of courts, a contract claim will lie.47 
 
That problem need not be resolved here.  The point is simply that this cluster of potential copyright and 
contract claims has nothing to do with the second central economic feature of software “licensing”: the 
licensor’s alleged retention of ownership of the individual copy of the program or other data file that is 
                                                 
45 A line of cases decided before enactment of the current Copyright Act implicitly rejects this analysis and holds 
that a licensee that exceeds the scope of an express license is liable for breach of an implied covenant not to do so.  
See Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920); County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1966); 
Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773 (N.Y. 1924).  The 
preemption provision of the current Act appears to deal directly with this issue by eliminating the contract claim in 
favor of the copyright claim, so long as the defendant has committed an act covered by section 106.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301(a) (2000); see also Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 732-33 (Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing the 
legislative history of section 301 and the position taken by Nimmer pertaining to contract claims regarding 
copyrights).  Yet some courts hold that breach of the license gives rise to both copyright and contract claims.  See 
SAS Inst., Inc., 605 F. Supp. at 816. 
46 A minority of courts analyzing preemption arguments regarding contract claims consider whether the substance of 
the promise to be enforced is itself the “equivalent” of an exclusive right of the copyright holder, or whether the 
defendant’s allegedly offending conduct is distinguishable from conduct that offends the Copyright Act.  There are 
recent examples of preemption analyses that distinguish copyright interests from non-copyright interests.  See 
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no preemption of claim of breach of 
implied-in-fact promise to pay for use of copyrighted work); Higher Gear Group, Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet 
Sales, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958-59 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (stating that a contract claim for breach of license will not 
be preempted where licensee breached contractual promise only to use software for its own business-related 
benefit). 
47 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (contractual enforcement of 
license barring reverse engineering of computer program not preempted because claim required proof of contractual 
duty owed to licensor, though whether “reverse engineering” lies within the scope of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights had, in other cases, been decided as a matter of statutory interpretation). 
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 acquired by the licensee.  A “licensee” that has, in economic terms, purchased a copy of a computer 
program (acquired permanent use of the program in exchange for some defined consideration) should be 
treated in copyright terms as having purchased that copy, statements in the “license” to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  Any other result effectively treats section 109, the codification of copyright’s first sale 
doctrine, as a nullity in the context of computer programs.  
 
 “Copies” of computer programs might be “licensed” and therefore excluded from section 109 (since 
users would not “own” their copies), but there is no evidence in the statute or in the logic and history of 
copyright law that supports permitting owners of copyrights in computer programs to have the power to 
“license” copies in ways that publishers of books and phonorecords cannot.48  Only the work of 
authorship may be licensed.  The tangible work gets sold, rented, or leased, and then returned.49   
 
Courts have had a difficult time maintaining these distinctions, and in practice, the distinctions are rarely 
observed in neat form in the cases.50  The analytic impulse tends to confuse the intangibility of the 
copyright interest and of the work of authorship that is protected by the copyright, on the one hand, with 
the intangibility of the computer program itself, on the other hand.  Just as a copy of a book is the tangible 
medium of expression that contains the intangible work of authorship that copyright law regards as a 
“literary work,” in copyright terms, paradoxically, each copy of an (allegedly intangible) computer 
program should be treated as the “tangible medium of expression” in which the copyrighted work of 
authorship is “fixed.” Software licenses that take advantage of that paradox are playing games with basic 
copyright doctrine.  The DMCA, which focuses on the act of circumventing technology that protects 
particular copies of copyrighted works, likewise skirts the edges of legitimate copyright policy when it 
regulates the “copy” rather than the work of authorship. 
 
Taken together, once these strands of legal doctrine and public policy are properly sorted out, it is clear 
that justifying software licensing in its current form requires more than simply an appeal to basic 
principles of mutual assent.  The contracting approach to software licenses fails ultimately because it does 
not acknowledge fundamental distinctions in copyright law between rights in tangible artifacts and in 
intangible works of authorship.51 
 
The question remains whether background property law—the law of chattels, rather than the law of 
copyright—enables an owner of tangible property to attach conditions to that item, which effectively 
follow it from owner to successor, with or without the successor’s assent to abide by the condition.  If 
                                                 
48 The ready reproducibility of computer software seems not to be a sufficient justification for a different rule.  The 
fact that users “reproduce” the program when they use it is irrelevant; Congress intended to permit that behavior 
when it enacted section 117, authorizing the reproduction of a copyrighted computer program in conjunction with 
the use of a computer.  See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).  Reproduction beyond ordinary use is captured under ordinary 
infringement principles. 
49 See United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and 
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999); David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of 
Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999). 
50 Compare Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (license agreement 
bars purchaser of “educational” copies of software from reselling to commercial purchasers), with SoftMan Prods. 
Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (license agreement not a bar to purchaser’s 
disaggregating bundled software and selling it as individual programs). 
51 The conceptual confusion is this area has been pointed out before with respect to stand-alone computer software 
licensing.  See Nimmer et al., supra note 49, at 34-41.  The confusion underlies ongoing difficulty in applying 
statutory preemption under 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).  See also Lemley, supra note 49, at 136-50 (discussing “click 
through” and “shrink-wrap” agreements). 
Madison – Legitimacy of Open Source – Manuscript of 1/25/05  -- Do Not Quote or Cite Without the 
Author’s Permission 
13
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 property law does, then here at last is a foundation for modern licensing practice that could be followed 
back through and thus rehabilitate the previous arguments.  The question has particular resonance in the 
context of open source models, which are supported in part on the ground that open source conditions 
bind the code itself, independent of assent by a particular user or developer.52 
 
The question has no clear answer.  American law seems to be highly skeptical of the proposition that one 
might transfer permanent possession of a chattel to someone else, yet retain title in order to prohibit or 
condition further transfers.53  Does federal law enable this kind of transaction?  Courts that have validated 
“licenses” of computer code itself have rarely gone beyond the label attached to the transaction by the 
licensor or beyond the licensor’s self-described economic needs.54  The only plausible place to look is the 
Copyright Act.  Section 202 of the Copyright Act confirms that ownership of the object is distinct from 
ownership of the copyright.55  This distinction leads, among other things, to the first sale doctrine,56 which 
would make no sense without section 202.  It also leads to the sensible conclusion that rights in the object 
are governed by the common law of property and not by federal law.57  Section 117, which authorizes an 
“owner” of a copy of a computer program to make another “copy” of that program under limited 
circumstances, might be read as authorizing an exception to section 202 in the context of computer 
programs by implicitly creating a category of non-owned, that is, “licensed,” physical copies whose 
possessors cannot rely on section 117.  Some courts have effectively read section 117 this way,58 enabling 
owners of copyrights in computer programs embedded in functional devices to extinguish potential 
competition in markets for the devices.  There is little evidence that Congress intended this result or that 
courts have in fact confronted the apparent conflict between these two sections.59  Section 117 speaks of a 
defense available to an owner of a “copy” of a computer program who would otherwise infringe the 
                                                 
52 See Radin & Wagner, supra note 17, at 1312-13 (characterizing the open source license as a covenant that runs 
with the code). 
53 One might analogize this problem in the context of software licenses to the problem of “ostensible ownership” in 
the law of secured lending, which more than one court has characterized as “the proposition that, other things being 
equal, what the creditor sees ought to be what the creditor gets.” Gaudet v. Babin (In re Zedda), 103 F.3d 1195, 1202 
(Bankr. 5th Cir. 1997). In that context, the problems created by the debtor’s ostensible ownership of assets that are 
the subject of contractual security interests are cured, at least as a legal matter, by elaborate systems of filings 
maintained in each state under Article 9 of the UCC.   
54 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (accepting license characterization 
on licensor’s documentation); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(accepting expert testimony by plaintiff’s expert that commercial software is always licensed). But see DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (examining “substance” of 
transaction to determine whether licensor conveyed rights equivalent to those typically received by purchaser). 
55 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). 
56 See id. § 109(a). 
57 The converse is also true, as rights in the intangible interest are governed by the Copyright Act and not by the 
common law of property.  See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-18 (1985) (mail fraud conviction for 
transporting “stolen” “goods” cannot be sustained based on infringement of copyright).  Dowling has been read 
narrowly by some subsequent courts.  Compare United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 467 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(emphasizing special nature of copyright law and refusing to extend Dowling to prosecution regarding trade secrets), 
with United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that Dowling removes intangible 
property from scope of federal stolen property statute). 
58 See DSC Communications Corp., 170 F.3d at 1359-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that telephone companies 
employing copyrighted software from the manufacturer were not necessarily “owners” of the software). 
59 But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70  (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that state law cannot 
authorize enforcement of a property right, in the form of a software “license,” that conflicts with section 117). 
Madison – Legitimacy of Open Source – Manuscript of 1/25/05  -- Do Not Quote or Cite Without the 
Author’s Permission 
14
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art15
 copyright in the work of authorship fixed in that “copy” by making another “copy” in the course of using 
that program.60  The Copyright Act defines “copies” as “material objects” in which works are fixed.61  
The point of section 117 was thus to expand the range of activities permitted to users of computer 
software, not to authorize creation of a separate “licensing” paradigm for copies themselves. 
 
What about the common law?  Actual law on this subject is scarce.62  Available commentary suggests that 
the common law ought not to be availing. Professor Zechariah Chafee characterized efforts to burden the 
title to chattels, even where the new possessor took with notice of the condition, as equitable servitudes in 
chattels that were presumptively invalid as restraints on alienation, if not forbidden outright.63  An 
alternative possibility is that the “license” form of the transaction in the chattel itself is a misnomer; the 
transaction constitutes something else.  It could be a lease, a term of years, although a term of years 
generally ends and the property subject to the lease is returned.  Software licenses could be leases in 
which the licensor/lessor agrees that the licensee/lessee need not return the code when the term is done or 
the useful life of the code has expired.  Yet code never wears out (although it may obsolesce), and there is 
often no term associated with the license.  Precedent suggests that this view would not be accepted.  Most 
courts dealing with commercial law issues affecting licensed computer programs almost uniformly have 
examined the substance of the “license” transaction and decided that it was a sale, or at least a transaction 
sufficiently analogous to a sale that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code should apply.64 
 
The fact that the law has not or has only incompletely recognized the form of ownership of chattels that 
enables software “licensing” does not mean automatically that this form should not be recognized today, 
but it does suggest that we should proceed with caution rather than simply accepting as inevitable the 
                                                 
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000). 
61 Id. § 101 (defining the term “copies”). 
62 But see McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 803-04, 817 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (refusing to 
enforce, in context of a trademark case, “license” label affixed to a bag containing Beanie Baby toys purchased by 
the defendant). 
63 See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956); see also 
Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software 
Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577, 579-81 (1994).  In the analog world, the law is clearer.  A book publisher 
cannot enforce in copyright a restriction on resale prices by making the resale price a condition of the initial sale.  
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350-51; cf. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 87-90 (2d Cir. 1940) (refusing 
to enforce restrictive legend on phonograph record). 
 A different rule appears to apply in patent law, though the Federal Circuit has not explained why it should.  
See B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, 
Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that the violation of a single-use restriction accompanying a patented 
item may be enforceable in suit for patent infringement); Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After 
Mallinckrodt—An Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 (1994) (characterizing Mallinckrodt as 
“simply fiat, judicial legislation” in contravention of decades of precedent).  The Federal Circuit recently extended 
the point in holding that a holder of a patent on engineered soybean seeds could enforce a “seed wrap” or “bag tag” 
license that accompanied acquisition of a batch of seeds by a farmer, under which the seeds were merely “licensed” 
to the farmer (for use during a single season), rather than sold. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 
1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that assent of “buyer” to license trumped the patent law doctrine of exhaustion, 
corresponding to copyright’s doctrine of first sale). 
64 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28-29 & n.13 (2d Cir. 2002); M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 2000). 
Madison – Legitimacy of Open Source – Manuscript of 1/25/05  -- Do Not Quote or Cite Without the 
Author’s Permission 
15
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 validity of licensing-as-governance.65  It may well be the case that we can develop the means, legally, to 
sustain the governance benefits that the licensing model appears to generate for information itself, without 
the governance costs that prohibitions on restraints on alienation are designed to avoid.  The question 
remains:  How can we do so? 
 
IV. THE DEVELOPING WORLD OF INFORMATION GOVERNANCE 
 
The basic problem is that the software licensing model takes two traditionally distinct concepts, control 
over a chattel and control over a work of authorship, and links them conceptually and formally in a 
governance structure that fails, as a result, adequately to denote “public” and “private” elements of 
information governance.  Is it possible to solve the problem of distinguishing “public” and “private” 
governance modes for computer software, given the doctrinal tools available in copyright, contract, and 
elsewhere in property law?  Is it possible for a software developer to distribute copies of a computer 
program and to make conditions on its use enforceable against successive generations of downstream 
users while taking account of the public domain, fair use, and other features of public copyright law?  Can 
the licensing norm govern legitimately as it proposes to do? 
 
A more imaginative copyright lawyer than I might design a software license so ingenious as to solve all of 
these problems. Within copyright law itself, section 117 offers a start, but even when read most 
generously (such that apparent “licenses” of copies of computer programs are properly interpreted as 
“sales” of those copies), it offers protection only to those who would make further “copies” of computer 
programs for their own use, not to those who would distribute copies for others’ use. The anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA might even be invoked by open source developers who encode 
copies of an open source kernel in an effective access- and rights-protecting “technological measure,” 
arguably assuring that rights in the code can be exercised only in conjunction with certain technical 
forms, such as the source code itself.  But there are complications, heightening the fragility of possible 
licensing-oriented solutions.   
 
The complications are two-fold.  The contrast between the intangible and the tangible that drives 
copyright law has been getting ever less pronounced, making this linkage more difficult to discern.66  
Technology is driving us not only toward easier technological implementation of license forms but also 
toward a world of information in which the “license” form itself is no longer easily understood as a legal 
category distinct from the information work itself.67  The “software” to which the license applies is no 
longer identifiably distinct from the “hardware” on which the “software” is supposed to run, and the 
“technological measure” is no longer clearly distinguishable from the “work of authorship” that it is 
                                                 
65 The universe of forms of property rights has historically been limited, a fact that only now is receiving theoretical 
attention.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 49-51 (2000) (arguing that the standardization of forms of property 
rights across a small number of defined types reduces information costs associated with transactions in property).  
This research dovetails with emerging arguments that emphasize the “thingness” of property.  See Michael A. 
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193-94 (1999) (noting inadequacies of the 
“bundle of rights” metaphor for property). 
66 See David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996). 
67 This idea is manifest in the reconstruction of software licenses as part of the products to which they relate.  See 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: 
Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 
(1998) (arguing that proposed UCC Article 2B affirms industry standard licensing practice); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1126 (1999) (describing conflicts over 
enforcement of online contracts as conflicts over models: contract-as-product versus contract-as-assent).  The 
contract-as-thing metaphor was introduced by in Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970). 
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 designed to protect.  Copyright licensing assumes a given state of the world—the existence of a work of 
authorship, embodied in a computer program or other tangible medium—to which the rules of the 
licensing regime can be applied.  If there is a regime of private “governance” at work, then there ought to 
be a set of rules and procedures, as well as a community of the governed and a population of objects 
whose use is regulated.  In a world of technological plasticity,68 the rules, the community, and the 
population of objects are merging, and the thin edge of the law that now permits us to characterize a 
license formally as a construct of property or contract disappears.  We no longer have a system that 
regulates.  We have a universe of objects that simply behave as they are designed to behave.  Governance 
is not something that occurs via licensing.  Governance is simply built into the program.69  There is no 
“public” and no “private”; there is just the technology itself.   
 
What does this have to do with licensing?  If we expect to be able to draw effective “public” and “private” 
distinctions in copyright law and policy based on tangibility, the evolution of the licensing norm that 
already compromises that ability is about to erase it altogether.  We need to be able to draw effective 
distinctions on some other basis, among valid and invalid forms, and (if appropriate) among “closed 
source” and “open source” models and DRM systems as forms of information governance.  In the twenty 
or so years in which computer programs and other forms of digital information have been a significant 
part of the copyright landscape, licensing law itself has not developed any other vocabulary for doing so.  
The open source model may be a novel instantiation of a legal form that is being extinguished, if it was 
ever legitimate in the first place, by technological progress. 
 
Professor Julie Cohen has suggested that a new licensing scheme, particularly one based on technological 
controls, should be assessed against a normative baseline supplied by existing law.  She argues in favor of 
an implied right of consumer self-help, to escape from oppressive technological restrictions on access and 
use of copyrighted works.70  If the design of the object is such that governance features are simply 
embedded in it, and those governance features deprive consumers of important rights (such as a right of 
private consumption or a right to share) that background law previously provided, then consumers should 
have the legal right to hack the designed object in order to make what history and tradition would treat as 
consumers’ “natural” right.71  Public interests in information law cannot be excluded from regulation 
solely on the basis of product design decisions. 
 
The proposal draws a helpful distinction between conventional licenses (the right to hack is forbidden, but 
it should not be) and the open source model (the right to hack is assured by license).  But it cannot 
overcome copyright’s difficulty with the tangible/intangible distinction, and it suggests that the 
“traditional” design of the creative environment (i.e., a population of tangible objects and a legal system 
for regulating them) is a normatively appropriate baseline for policy analysis.  Changes to that baseline 
become challengeable solely on account of their design.  But books (paper books) may not be normative; 
they merely may be accidents of technology and political economy.72  And stepping into the design studio 
                                                 
68 Lawrence Lessig refers to the world of computer technology as “plastic” in the sense that digital technology can 
be relatively quickly and relatively cheaply changed to suit the needs of information producers, of the law, or of any 
suitably demanding interest.  See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1747 (1995). 
69 This aspect of computer technology received broad attention through the work of William Mitchell and Lawrence 
Lessig.  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, 
CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND THE INFOBAHN (1996).   
70 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1142 (1998). 
71 See id. at 1141 (explaining “right to hack”). 
72 See generally ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK: PRINT AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING (1998).  The 
author argues that the development of the printed book as intrinsically reliable, free of textual piracy, was not 
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 is an approach that information law and public policy usually shy away from, and with good reason.73  
How is a judge or a legislator to know that “the state of things” that copyright historically assumed or that 
now exists is the “right” state of things, and that he or she should follow that instinct with a legally-
protected privilege to resist change?  Consumer expectations are important, and a reconstructed model of 
information transactions should be concerned with the relational interests of consumers at least as much 
as with the ownership claims of producers.74  But consumer interests are not everything.  They can be 
manipulated both rhetorically and substantively.  In a different sense, excessive deference to consumer 
expectations might justify unconditional acquiescence to the licensing norm.75 
 
A second solution is to draw on that other regime of intellectual property rights, patent law.  The patent 
world offers a number of advantages over the copyright world.  A patent need not concern a tangible 
thing, and a patent, unlike a copyright, may cover a process or method.  Moreover, patent law does not 
take the world as it is found.  Patent law defines the world for itself.  The patenting process starts with 
some technological artifact, such as a machine, a process, or a composition of matter.  The inventor 
submits a patent application that characterizes the invention in patent-ese, hoping to have some of that 
description of the invention allowed as “claims.”  In effect, the patenting process transforms the artifact-
as-found into an artifact-in-law, giving the invention a legal identity and defining the scope of what is 
“found” (private) and what is “free” (public).76  The end product is protected by a legal regime that does 
not depend on a chain of privity between the rights holder and the accused infringer.  Copyright 
infringement requires copying, which means that there must be some link between the rights owner’s 
creation of the work and the defendant’s infringement.  Patent infringement requires only an invasion of 
what the patent itself has declared to be “private”; the patent holder need not prove the existence of any 
comparable chain.  Moreover, the inside/outside boundary is not defined by the artifact itself, or by the 
parties creating or consuming the invention, but by the operation of the legal system (theoretically acting 
on behalf of the public), negotiating with the inventor.77  The scope of the “private governance” exercised 
by the patent instrument is not unilaterally declared by the inventor (at least, this is the way the system is 
supposed to work) but is itself a process that proclaims and is informed by the public interest. 
 
                                                 
 
inevitable.  Rather, the printed book is the product of a “complex set of social and technological processes.”  Id. at 
2-5. 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that courts generally view 
with skepticism claims of anticompetitive behavior based on product innovation); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (noting that judges’ opinions as to whether lesser works of art 
(posters and lithographs) have enough aesthetic value to warrant copyright protection should be avoided). 
74 Proposals to steer information regulation more explicitly in the direction of unfair competition are correct to 
recognize this point, though they, too, tend to take the world of protected works as a given and re-work liability rules 
from that baseline.  See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE 
INTERNET 171-86 (2001); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 51 (1997). 
75 For the same reason I exclude “the commons” as a normative proposition, as opposed to a political or rhetorical 
strategy. 
76 In addition, by contrast with software licensing and its efforts to include trade secrecy protections for software 
developers, patent law comes with an express policy admonition favoring public disclosure of new technology and 
discouraging reliance on trade secrecy.  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 
(1989). 
77 This model is complicated by the canons of claim construction, which largely incorporate traditions and custom in 
the relevant industrial practice.  See KIMBERLY PACE MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION & STRATEGY 206-13 
(1999). 
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 The notion that patent law might redeem digital information governance may be alarming to some, 
particularly those for whom open source licensing is a concrete response to the perceived excesses of 
patent law as applied to software.  I do not suggest that software should be patentable, at least not in terms 
of the contemporary patent system.  What I suggest is simply that the creation of the patent itself 
represents a negotiation over the scope of downstream relationships among further inventors and 
consumers of the relevant technology78 in a way that resembles the negotiation among the interests now 
represented in software licenses.79  The process of patenting is accompanied by a vocabulary of public 
and private considerations that even the most inveterate promoters of strong patents recognize as 
legitimate.  The software licensing system currently includes no coherent mechanism for taking account 
of the public interest.  For all of its myriad flaws,80 patent law does.  The right scheme for managing legal 
rights regarding software and digital information might begin from a patent-style premise, rather than 
from a copyright-style premise. 
 
Let me then sketch the beginnings of a third approach, which relies on neither tradition (the right to hack) 
nor form (the issued patent).  In determining the extent to which they will defer to private governance 
arrangements for real property environments, some recent courts have focused on the characteristics of 
the environment itself, as those characteristics are interpreted by the public.  Thus, recent claims by the 
public for access to technically private but apparently public spaces have been analyzed not based on the 
“traditional” function of the space in question or the formal designation of the property as “public” or 
“private,” but on the basis of social understandings of its contemporary physical attributes.  In First 
Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp.,81 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that The Mormon Church, though technically the owner of Main Street Plaza in Salt Lake City, could not 
enforce conduct restrictions on the behavior of citizens strolling on its sidewalks.82  The city had retained 
an easement stipulating that the block remain open to the public, and there was no indication visible to 
those citizens that what by all accounts appeared to be a public sidewalk was not, in fact, “public.”83  In 
Hotel Employees v. City of New York Department of Parks and Recreation,84 union organizers lost their 
bid for access to Lincoln Center Plaza in New York City. In ruling that the plaza was not a public space, a 
panel of the Second Circuit leaned heavily on the fact that its physical characteristics distinguished it and 
separated it from the neighboring sidewalks and connoted a “private” rather than a “public” space.85  Such 
a cognitive approach to the public or private distinction has some intriguing potential applications in the 
information environment.86  Digital information fails to do much, on its own, to signal its inherently 
                                                 
78 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529-36 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., 
concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
79 Just as the open source model is designed to support a form of structured collaboration, it has been suggested that 
favoring patent protection over copyright protection for computer software would have a comparable and beneficial 
effect.  See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1997) 
(arguing that reliance on software patents may encourage licensing among developers and thus more innovation in 
the software industry). 
80 See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business 
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 588-91 (1999). 
81 First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002). 
82 Id. at 1121. 
83 Id. 
84 Hotel Employees v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534 (2d Cir. 2002). 
85 Id. at 544. 
86 See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 458-72 
(2003). 
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“public” or “private” character. A legal regime that relies on and therefore recursively encourages the 
development of equivalent demarcations in cultural artifacts—whether tangible or intangible or some 
combination—might provide a useful starting point for matching private interests in information 
development and distribution with interests in access and the creation and maintenance of a public 
information sphere. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The last twenty years may not have taught software lawyers much about how to talk about licensing law 
in coherent terms, but it has taught them that licensing is the right language to speak.  The information-
creating and information-consuming public may be on its way to the same condition.  But the conceptual 
vocabulary of software and information licensing is fundamentally flawed.  The effort to draft and enact 
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), arguably an effort to create precisely the 
kind of vocabulary that I suggest we still need, floundered in large part on its premise that “licensing” 
itself constituted a valid vocabulary for both the tangible and intangible, one that simply needed to be 
encoded into positive law.  The DMCA is controversial and flawed for the same reason.  Yet the open 
source model does not fight the licensing norm.  Open source depends on it.  On those terms open source 
might not succeed.  In the information environment, at the end of the day the task of governing is the task 
of distinguishing “public” from “private.”  But the licensing norm that does so comes from worlds of 
tangibility and intangibility, and as those worlds collapse into one, we are left only with licensing that is 
tangible, which is not the world that copyright anticipates, even in its most optimistic, public-oriented 
version.  The licensed open source world is then conceptually equivalent to the licensed closed source 
world.  What I suggest here is that if the open source model wants to govern, to produce and preserve an 
information commons, then it may be better off abandoning the discourse of copyright licensing and 
finding an alternative, perhaps in copyright law and legislation, perhaps elsewhere. 
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